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[Abstract] 
This article examines the contribution of the European Court of Human 
Rights to the development of interrogational fairness at the pretrial phase in 
modern European criminal proceedings. Although the Convention contains no 
explicit reference to the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-
incrimination, the Court, drawing its rationale from Article 6 of the Convention, 
has been steadily developing its distinctive vision of these immunities in an 
attempt to create a doctrine that sets a limit below which contracting parties 
could not allow their legal systems to fall, while also acting in accordance with 
the established procedures within the civil and common law traditions of its 
Contracting States. It is shown that the Court’s jurisprudence has produced a 
carefully balanced doctrinal framework that respects the individual’s choice to 
remain silent without creating absolute immunities. Simultaneously the Court’s 
approach in defining defence rights not only reflects what is says about the 
universality of the right to remain silent but also gives plenty of scope for 
diverse applications in different institutional and cultural settings. 
1 Introduction 
Police interrogation during the investigation phase is recognized as an 
accepted and essential aspect of law enforcement in all legal systems. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, police questioning as an aid to law enforcement 
has been the focus of intense interest and debate continuously. Specifically, the 
recognition of the value of confessions has been accompanied by concerns over 
the factual accuracy of statements and the fairness of the manner in which they 
are obtained (Ma, 2000). 
 
On the European continent, in both common and civil law traditions, the 
judge at trial must decide what evidence can and cannot be used for a 
conviction. The incriminating statements and silence made during the course of 
police interrogation and used as evidence against the suspect is one of the issues 
that trial judges or juries consider on a routine basis. It is here that we encounter 
one of the most often repeated generalizations in comparative discussion of the 
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law of confession. It is said that common law systems are mainly concerned with 
the issue of admissibility and tend to emphasize the respect given to a suspect’s 
autonomous right to decide whether and how to participate in defending 
herself. Civil law systems, on the other hand, emphasize a more ‘social’ 
approach which obliges states to take positive action to protect the rights of the 
suspect and to take account of all statements that are logically relevant whether 
of an exculpatory or inculpatory nature (Damaska, 1973; Jackson, 2009b). 
Certainly, no system in reality is entirely adversarial or entirely inquisitorial, but 
in most systems the values of one or the other model appear to predominate 
(Sanders and Young, 2007). 
 
However, in recent years, some commentators have detected a slow, gradual 
‘convergence’ in the interrogation procedure of common and civil law systems 
in Europe (Bradley, 1999; Van Kessel, 2002). As knowledge of, and familiarity 
with, other systems increases, each legal system is tempted to seek new solutions 
to deal with similar problems drawing from the experience of others. Therefore, 
inquisitorial procedures are increasingly influenced by the necessity of fairness 
in police interrogation at the pretrial stage, whereas there are some indications 
that adversarial questioning is beginning to avail itself of the instruments of 
truth-finding. In addition to these internal pressures, there have been external 
pressures on states to adopt common procedural standards in police 
questioning. The thrust toward ‘convergence’ would seem to be at its strongest 
within Europe where supranational institutions, such as the Council of Europe 
and the European Union 1 , provide a vehicle for strengthening cooperation 
within a framework of common procedural rights and guarantees laid down by 
the European Convention on Human Rights and, more recently, the EU Charter 
of Rights (Cape, Namoradze, Smith, and Spronken, 2010). Notably, although the 
European Court of Human Rights has neither the jurisdiction to strike down 
national laws, nor have the authority to order a state to change its legislation, it 
is estimated that, taken together, both the text of the Convention and the 
jurisprudence of the Court have inspired numerous national, constitutional, and 
other court decisions. The European Court of Human Rights has also been the 
inspiration for legislative changes (Lahti, 1999; Jackson, 2005). Moreover, it has 
been the hope of European human rights law observers that the Court, through 
its Jurisprudence in completing and enriching the often vague text of the 
                                                             
1
 Article 82 § 2 of the Lisbon Treaty provides for the establishment of minimum rules in 
respect of, inter alia, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure. Further, on 1 July, 2009, 
the Swedish Presidency presented a Roadmap for Strengthening Procedural Rights of 
Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings. The Roadmap was incorporated into 
the Stockholm Programme for the period 2010—2014, which was adopted by the European 
Council on 10/11 December, 2009. The Roadmap, which provides for a step-by-step 
approach, identifies six areas that future EU work should focus on. Specifically, Measure C of 
the Roadmap, which is mainly concerned with the right to a legal counsel at the earliest 
appropriate stage of criminal proceedings, is due to be legislated in 2011. 
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Convention, may exert a harmonizing influence on the criminal justice practices 
in the Contracting States (Ma, 2000;  {rd, 2006). 
 
This article explores the jurisprudence on the right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination of the Court, which has been attempting to 
fashion common standards of interrogation fairness across the common law and 
civil law systems of criminal procedure in Europe for a number of years.  
Although the Convention contains no explicit reference to the above right and 
the privilege, the Court, drawing its rationale from Article 6 of the Convention, 
has been steadily producing a carefully balanced doctrinal framework that 
respects the individual’s choice to remain silent without creating absolute 
immunities. It is shown that the Court’s approach in defining defence rights not 
only reflects the universal rationale of the right to remain silent but also gives 
plenty of scope for diverse applications in different institutional and cultural 
settings. 
 
This article is in three parts. First, we will identify the features and 
limitations of the traditional adversarial–inquisitorial dichotomy. Second, we 
will trace the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination with the object of showing how the Court 
has interpreted these immunities to develop its own distinctive version, thus 
throwing some light upon the practical value of the guarantee provided therein. 
The last part concludes. 
 
2 Background 
Before we come to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, we will first identify the features and limitations of the traditional 
adversarial–inquisitorial dichotomy. 
 
2.1 The Adversarial and Inquisitorial Dichotomy 
Enforcing the criminal law is crucial to every society, but the pursuit of the 
ultimate social goals of criminal justice must be qualified by the goal of avoiding 
miscarriages of justice: the guilty should be punished and the innocent left alone 
(Sanders, Young, and Burton, 2010). Based on different ways in approaching a 
rational fact-finding process, the criminal justice system has been classically 
divided as being either adversarial or inquisitorial (Jorg, Field, and Brants, 1995). 
It is noted that the two systems differ in their fundamental assumptions as to the 
best way of arriving at ‚the truth‛. 
 
The adversarial system, in theory, promotes truth-finding through the 
partisan clash of opposing viewpoints in which each side pursues its narrow 
self-interest (Jorg et al 1995; Leo, 2008). This approach draws on the system’s 
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historic distrust of state power. It reflects the classic liberal idea that state power 
must be checked to prevent an unjust or corrupt structure coming into being that 
would regularly risk the wrongful convictions of the innocent (Sanders, Young, 
and Burton, 2010; Leo, 2008). Thus, to hold state agents accountable at each stage 
of the criminal process, the suspect is endowed with a number of procedural 
presumptions and privileges even as the prosecution is saddled with procedural 
burdens, holding it to a complex web of rules of evidence (Jorg et al. 1995; 
Jackson, 2009b). Perhaps most importantly, the suspects are represented by 
attorneys whose obligation, however, is not to pursue truth itself but to 
zealously advocate the client’s interest. In police questioning, this means that the 
attorney may prevent the introduction of highly probative evidence, for 
example, by advising the client not to speak, testify or cooperate, minimizing the 
importance of unfavourable facts, and trying to construe inferences from 
ambiguous evidence in the client’s favour (Sanders, Young and Burton, 2010). By 
emphasizing the pursuit of self-interest and delegating to the parties the control 
of gathering and presenting evidence, the adversarial system is supposed to 
motivate the parties to assiduously discover facts. In principle at least, there is a 
strict demarcation between the investigative and trial stage in adversarial 
systems and the determination of guilt is reserved for the trial. The most 
traditional assumption in the adversarial theory is that real equality of parties 
and the oral contest involved in courtroom procedure will lead to truth 
emerging. The adversarial clash of partisan perspectives is supposed to leave the 
judge in the most informed position to adjudicate between disputed claims (Leo, 
2008). 
 
An inquisitorial system, by contrast, assumes that the state can be largely 
trusted to conduct a neutral investigation into the truth and the truth can be, and 
must be, discovered in an investigative procedure (Jorg et al. 1995; Sanders, 
Young, and Burton, 2010). Because it may be in the interests of parties to conceal 
the evidence, it is assumed that the legal professionals are best equipped to carry 
out such investigations. Based on the assumption that professional investigators 
employed by the state can do the criminal inquiry in a detached and impartial 
manner, the need for procedural safeguards such as a strict separation of 
investigative and adjudicative powers, rules of evidence, and defence lawyers is 
seen as much diminished. Public interest, rather than self-interest, is the key 
purpose here. This means, in contrast to lawyers in an adversarial system where 
a counsel may ‘terminate’ police interrogation by advising a client to answer no 
further questions, the defence lawyer’s role within inquisitorial procedures 
serves to demonstrate that the investigative officials adhere to the rules rather 
than ‘end’ the police questioning (Hodgson, 2006). In principle, therefore, it is 
possible for suspects to be subjected to police interrogation without access to 
legal advice in this procedure (Sanders and Young, 2010). Importantly, the 
legitimacy of the inquisitorial procedure requires an inordinate amount of faith 
in the integrity of the state and its capacity to pursue truth unprompted by 
partisan pressures of individual self-interest and untrammelled by equality of 
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arms (Jorg et al. 1995, 43). Consequently, in the inquisitorial approach, the line 
between the investigative and trial stage is less clear. From a functional point of 
view, although the judges in an inquisitorial court actively engage in discovering 
‘the truth’, they are adjudicative rather than legislative (Jorg et al. 1995, 44). 
 
One difference between the adversarial and inquisitorial approaches lies in 
their degree of success in discovering the truth. In Jeremy Bentham’s view, the 
passiveness of the suspect in the adversarial questioning, in theory at least, had 
the inevitable effect of excluding the suspect’s confessions (Helmholz, 1997, 3). 
As Damaska (1973: 587) observes, ‚The Anglo-American adversary system’s 
commitment to values rather than the pursuit of truth has caused it to erect 
higher evidentiary barriers than its continental non-adversary counterpart.‛ 
Notably, this does not mean that its factual findings are ipso facto more reliable. 
Higher barrier to convictions not only decreases the chances of an innocent 
person being convicted but also increases the chances of the guilty escaping 
punishment (Alschuler, 1997). Similarly, inquisitorial procedure committing to 
the discovery of truth is not better equipped to achieve precision in its fact 
finding. Truth may be loved unwisely or too much. If permanently hidden and 
therefore unchallenged, the state’s abilities to interrogate the suspect and to 
discover the truth are equally dangerous. An example that presents the issue is 
the demanding standard of proof-sufficiency in medieval law, designed to 
decrease false convictions, which led to the use of torture in criminal 
investigations, a practice that undoubtedly increased false convictions 
(Langbein, 2004). Apart from this extreme example, although the accused in a 
democratic context should not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself, all 
too often, because of strong desires among police officers not to release a suspect 
until the truth as perceived by the police has been ascertained, the supposed 
safeguard against aggressive questioning offered by judicial control of the 
interrogation process becomes a chimera. Surely, information extracted under 
improper physical or psychological pressures comes with no guarantee of 
reliability (Jackson, 2009a). 
 
Which of the two rival systems is better adapted to fact-finding precision has 
been the subject of great dispute at least since the nineteenth century. Even if one 
of the two systems is found to be better adapted to the discovery of truth, this 
will not be decisive. In the dialectics of the criminal process, concern for 
individual rights often sets limits to the pursuit of truth and at odds with the 
truth-finding considerations. According to Damaska (1973), the relation between 
fact-finding precision and fairness in criminal process is a zero-sum game, ‚for it 
often happens that what is gained on one front is lost on another (p. 589).‛ 
Therefore, no opinion on whether one type of procedure is superior to the other 
both in terms of its fact-finding precision and in terms of its fairness can be 
voiced. 
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2.2 Legal System in Practice 
Here we must emphasize that the classical models of adversarial and 
inquisitorial legal systems discussed above are theoretical ones, describing ideal 
types and not necessarily the functioning of the system in practice. No system in 
reality can correspond exactly with either model, but in most systems the values 
of one or the other model appear to predominate (Sanders and Young, 2007). 
The adversarial system is generally adopted in common law countries, such as 
in the England, Unites States, Canada, and Australia. Civil law countries in 
continental Europe such as France, Germany, and Netherlands are regarded as 
typical examples of inquisitorial system. 
 
In recent years, national legal systems are attempting to seek ‘foreign’ 
solutions to similar problems in the criminal justice system. Therefore, in the 
field of the law of confession, changes are occurring in both systems, in the 
composition of the mixture between concerns over the factual accuracy of 
statements and the fairness of the manner in which they are obtained, and these 
are reflected in piecemeal changes in the organization of criminal procedure. To 
take two examples, despite the traditional emphasis in the inquisitorial system 
on the importance of truth-finding, continental European countries, however, 
has seen a growth in administering warnings to suspects about their right to 
remain silent prior to interrogation and the use of an exclusionary rule to ensure 
the police compliance with the warning requirement2 (Ma, 2007). A counter-
tendency in common law jurisdictions, away from an emphasis on respect for 
autonomy, however, is seen in the shift from giving more procedural safeguards 
in police questioning. The modification of British law in 1994 that curtails the 
right to silence and permits the courts to draw adverse inferences from a 
suspect’s failure to answer police questions3 is a clear example of crime control 
                                                             
2
 Notably, forty-five years ago, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to the pretrial 
interrogation of suspects in custody, few European countries required the police to issue 
preinterrogation warnings. Except for coerced confessions, it was also rare for European 
courts to exclude evidence for police failure to follow procedure rules (Ma, 2007, 6). The U.S. 
Court then seemed to lead the way in expanding the procedural safeguards for suspects 
subject to police inquiry. Nevertheless, in the post-Miranda cases, to accommodate the 
conflicting interests between law enforcement and individual interests in police 
interrogation cases, the U.S. Court has carved various exceptions out of Miranda exclusion 
policy, for instance, the public security exception, which permits the police to interrogate a 
suspect without the Miranda warning if there is evidence indicating that immediate 
interrogation is necessary for some urgent public need (Ma, 2007; Roth, 2008). 
3
 According to The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), silence during the 
police questioning should not be capable of being the subject of adverse comment by both 
the judge and the prosecution. In particular, the judge was not permitted to suggest to the 
jury that silence or a refusal to answer questions is in any way evidence of guilt (Zander, 
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concerns (O’Reilly, 1997). It is clear that inquisitorial procedure is increasingly 
influenced by the necessity of fairness in police questioning at the pretrial stage, 
even as there are some indications that adversarial interrogation is beginning to 
avail itself of the instruments of truth-finding. 
 
These developments would appear to suggest gradual convergence (Bradley, 
1999; Van Kessel, 2002). The idea mixture, of course, is optimal truth-finding and 
fundamental fairness. Undoubtedly, truth-finding and fairness are the 
distinctive aims of criminal justice and the legitimacy of each legal system 
depends on its ability to do both. However, recent comparative scholarship has 
pointed to counter-influences at work that are actually moving the systems 
further away from each other. On the one hand, legal transplants may not have 
the effects that are intended. Because of institutional and cultural resistance 
within the receiving system, attempts to import ‘foreign’ solutions often lead to 
practices being ‘translated’ in a different way and this can lead to fragmentation 
and divergence rather than convergence within the systems concerned (Langer, 
2004: 3-4). This suggests that we must not lose sight of the risk involved in 
adopting strategies and safeguards from each other’s procedural styles. For 
interrogation safeguards to be adequate and effective, each system depends on 
its own historically developed institutions and the faith that different societies 
place in them. On the other hand, it is at the time when a state exercises its law 
enforcement authorities that the substantive individual rights are most likely to 
clash with the state’s interest in seeking the most effective means of crime 
control (Ma, 2000; Summers, 2007). Hence, as Jorg et al. (1995: 53) pointed out, 
‚If there are distinctive values supporting both truth-finding and fairness of 
procedure, minimum standards for the pursuit of each must be established as 
explicit objectives.‛ 
 
It is in this field of criminal procedural safeguards in police questioning, in 
the matter of forcing the state to accept full responsibility for ensuring that their 
own systems produce optimal results, that the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights has the greatest role to play. In the next section, we will 
trace the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the right to remain silent and the 
privilege against self-incrimination with the objective of showing how the Court 
has interpreted these immunities to develop its own distinctive version thus 
throwing some light upon the practical value of the guarantee provided therein. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1990, 144). However, the modification was made by the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act 1994 (CJPOA). 
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3 The Approach of the Court toward 
Interrogation Fairness 
In this section, we will expose readers to the Court’s jurisprudence on the 
right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination and their 
implications for the development of interrogation standards in the Contracting 
States. To help readers gain a better perspective of the implications of Court 
decisions, this section will start by providing a brief introduction on the history 
and status of the Court. 
 
3.1 The Rights to a Fair Police Interrogation 
In the aftermath of the World WarⅡ, to prevent the types of atrocities that 
took place in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, the international 
community sought to express universal principles regarding state behaviour 
toward individuals. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 was the platform from which the principles in the language of ‚human 
rights‛ were first propounded (Guild, 2004). As the decades have progressed, 
human rights have moved on from their initial 1948 source as they have become 
codified in a series of international human rights treaties, notably the European 
Convention on Human Rights adopted by the European Council in 1950. The 
Convention represents a major effort by its Contracting States, now forty-seven 
in number, to establish a common legal standard for the protection of individual 
rights and freedom (Berger, 2006). 
 
The European Convention is a unique supranational document of protection 
of human rights. With it were set up the two supervisory and enforcement 
organs, the European Commission of Human Rights4 and the European Court of 
Human Rights, to ensure the observance of the obligations that states assume 
under the Convention (Merrills, 1988). Specifically, the European Court 
interprets and applies the Convention when making decisions in individual 
cases. European citizens who have exhausted all approaches for remedies before 
their domestic courts may lodge a complaint with the Court claiming that one of 
their rights protected by the Convention was violated. However, acting neither 
as a European constitutional Court nor as a European Court of Appeal, the 
Court does not have the authority to strike down national laws nor does the 
Court consider that it can order a Contracting State to change its legislation. 
Therefore, as a matter of principle, the Court’s competence has been restricted to 
                                                             
4
 The Commission was abolished in 1998 under Protocol NO. 11. The Court now performs 
both the initial screening function, which used to be performed by the Commission, and the 
function of final adjudication. Nevertheless, reports that the Commission prepared during its 
existence are still an important source of information as to the interpretation of the 
Convention (Herrmann, 2008). 
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declaring a breach of the Convention and awarding compensation to the 
applicant without repealing domestic legislation or quashing judicial decisions 
in question (Herrmann, 2007). 
 
This ‘modest’ approach adopted by the Court is also for the sake of 
respecting state sovereignty. The Convention was adopted with the consent of 
the member states of the Council of Europe and the Court’s operation 
presupposes the preservation of that consensus ( {rd, 2006, 39). The Court was 
aware of the Contracting States’ sovereignty concerns and the Court’s own 
‘democracy deficit’. Therefore, as a general rule, the Court has avoided directly 
interfering with national law. Nevertheless, as Ma (2000: 56) noted, ‚most states 
do choose to change national laws that are questioned by the Court‛. It is true 
that the Court can hardly be said to have acted as a truly independent European 
‘Supreme’ Court because its judgments are declaratory rather than prescriptive. 
But this distinction has become blurred as the jurisprudence of the Court has 
come to complete and enrich the often vague text of the Convention and in this 
manner arrive at a set of norms that seems increasingly to be that of a true 
supranational legal order (Jackson, 2005;  {rd, 2006). 
 
In practice, the parts of the Convention most commonly invoked in 
applications made to Strasbourg authorities have been those in Article 6 on 
ensuring the right of fair proceedings in determining criminal liabilities (Harris, 
1970; Brems, 2005). Specifically, the primary objective of Article 6 is to guarantee 
the right to a fair trial, which is a recognizable feature of every significant 
international Convention or Treaty proclaiming an allegiance to democracy, the 
rule of law and protecting human rights (Toney, 2001; Summers, 2007: 97). 
Identifying only a limited number of particularized standards within the 
broader fair hearing guarantees, Article 6 broadly protects individual rights in 
criminal proceedings (Jackson, 2005; Berger, 2006). Taken at face value, in the 
criminal context, the specific rights incorporated in Article 6 appear to only 
apply to those who are ‚charged with criminal offence‛5. This would seem to 
preclude its application to pretrial procedures such as police interrogation6 . 
However, in Imbrioscia v Switzerland7 the Court indicated that: 
 
‚[t]he primary purpose of Article 6 (art. 6) as far as criminal matters are concerned is to 
ensure a fair trial by a ‚tribunal‛ competent to determine ‚any criminal charge‛, but it does not 
follow that the Article (art. 6) has no application to pre-trial proceedings < Article 6 (art. 6) – 
                                                             
5
 Article 6 (1) provides “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time…”. In addition, Article 6(3), which enumerate additional protection, states 
that “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights…”. 
6
 In the commission's view, a person becomes “charged” for Article 6 purposes at the point 
when he is “substantially affected” by the proceedings taken against him (ECtHR 27 February 
1980, Deweer v. Belgium, (no. 6903/75), § 46). 
7
 ECtHR 24 November 1993, Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, (no. 13972/88), § 36. 
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especially of paragraph 3 (art. 6-3) – may also be relevant before a case is sent for trial if and in 
so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply 
with them.‛ 
 
Even as acknowledging that ‚the investigation proceedings are of great 
importance for the preparation of the trial‛8, many scholars have found that the 
Strasbourg authorities were careful to avoid announcing a general principle on 
whether the full panoply of rights under Article 6 was applicable at the stage of 
a preliminary investigation, notably the police interrogation (Toney, 2001; 
Summers, 2007; Jackson, 2009a, 2009b). The reasons are many, but the most 
plausible explanation lies in the Court’s acknowledgment of criminal proceeding 
as involving two distinct stages—trial and pretrial stage—and of the consequent 
differences in the nature of the rights that are required in the respective phase 
(Summers, 2007). 
 
Instead, the Court has interpreted Article 6 to include the right to remain 
silent and the privilege against self-incrimination as part of the fair trial 
standard, and in a series of cases9 has been crafting a set of jurisprudence to 
define how much the Convention will protect an individual charged with 
criminal offenses despite state efforts to the production of incriminating 
evidence. 
 
3.2 The Right to Remain Silent and the Privilege 
against Self-incrimination 
Currently in Europe, in both common law and civil law traditions, there is a 
near-universal agreement on the importance of the right to remain silent and 
privilege against self-incrimination as effective safeguards in police questioning 
for individuals suspected of having committed a crime (Van Kessel, 1998: 804; 
Jackson, 2005: 835). Although the Convention contains no explicit guarantee of 
these immunities, in Funke v France10 the Court gave an important symbolic 
statement of the significance of the right to remain silent and the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the Court repeatedly stated that11: 
 
                                                             
8
 Can v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14, para. 53 (1985) (Commission report). 
9
 In the following, the paper traces the series of cases concerning the right to remain silent 
and the privilege against self-incrimination to examine the rationale put forward by the 
Court. See, for instance, ECtHR 25 January 1996, John Murray v. The United Kingdom, (no. 
41/1994/488/570), ECtHR 29 November 1996, Saunders v. The United Kingdom, (no. 
43/1994/490/572), ECtHR 5 February 2003, Allan v. The United Kingdom, (no. 48539/99), 
and ECtHR 27 November 2008, Salduz v. Turkey, (no. 36391/02). 
10
 ECtHR 25 February 1993, Funke v. France, (no. 10828/84), § 44. 
11
 ECtHR 25 January 1996, John Murray v. The United Kingdom, (no. 41/1994/488/570), § 45. 
ECtHR 29 November 1996, Saunders v. The United Kingdom, (no. 43/1994/490/572), § 68. 
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‚Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention, there can be no 
doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and the privilege against self-
incrimination are generally recognized international standards which lie at the heart of the 
notion of a fair trial < By providing the accused with protection against improper compulsion 
by the authorities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to 
securing the aims of Article 6.‛ 
 
The absence of specific provisions establishing the right and the privilege 
under the Convention has enabled the Court to be quite flexible about the 
confession standards that are to be equated with Article 6, permitting the Court 
to develop its distinctive set of parameters to define the reach of these 
immunities. As we saw in the previous section, the police questioning process 
involves conflicting values, aims, and interests: law enforcement has an interest 
in obtaining a confession or incriminating statement from the guilty to lead to 
the solution of crimes and individuals should be protected from abusive or 
overreaching interrogation practices. The two sides may clash and yet at the 
same time depend on each other for legitimacy. Although all legal systems in 
Europe provide for the respect of the rights of the defence during interrogation 
proceedings, in balancing the public interest in crime control against individual 
interest in freedom from police coercive tactics, the civil law and common law 
systems adopt significantly different ways. Yet no one can say that the 
procedure in either civil or common law models is superior to the other both 
with regards to its fact-finding precision and its fairness. Importantly, the Court 
itself did not set out with any presumption that the common law concept of a 
‚fair‛ police questioning is superior to the civil law concept, or the latter 
superior to the former (Summers, 2007, 98). In drawing attention to 
shortcomings in the procedures of national systems, the Court has tried to 
‘translate’ the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination 
in such a manner as to make them amenable to diverse institutional frameworks 
of its Contracting States and accommodation within both common law and civil 
law traditions. 
 
3.2.1 The Scope of the Right and the Privilege 
The need to balance important competing interests requires the Court to 
develop standards for determining when the setting in which incriminating 
information is sought is sufficient to warrant application of the right and the 
privilege. And the degree to which limitations may be put upon the exercise of 
these immunities would seem to depend on how broad the scope of the 
immunities is considered to be. Although the right and the privilege were 
enunciated early on Funke v France12, the scope of the immunities has undergone 
development and refinement over the years. 
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 ECtHR 25 February 1993, Funke v. France, (no. 10828/84). 
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In the case of Funke, the Court based its acceptance of the right and the 
privilege on its view of the generally accepted European jurisprudence 
principles (Berge, 2006). However, nothing was said about the scope of the 
immunities, or about their nature and rationales. Some three years passed, 
during which the implications of Funke judgment were unclear, before the topic 
again attracted the attention of the Court. In John Murray v United Kingdom, the 
Court made it clear that warning suspects that adverse inferences may be drawn 
against them at their trial amounted to an indirect form of compulsion that did 
not necessarily destroy the very essence of the privilege. The Court went on to 
state that ‚the right to remain silent‛ was not absolute, in the sense that the 
immunities could and should not prevent the accused’s silence from being taken 
into account in situations that clearly called for an explanation13. 
 
Whereas the John Murray decision confirmed the place of the right and the 
privilege in European human rights law, the scope of these immunities still 
awaited a detailed examination by the Court. This was not long in coming, in the 
case of Saunders v. United Kingdom 14 , decided in 1997. The case of Saunders 
concerned the use of statements made at the applicant’s criminal trial, which had 
been obtained under local compulsion under the Company Act 1985. In the 
instant case, the Court noted that testimony obtained under compulsion that 
appears on its face to be of a nonincriminating nature — such as exculpatory 
remarks or mere information on questions of fact — may later be deployed in 
criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution, for example, to contradict or 
cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him or her 
during the trial or to otherwise undermine the suspect’s credibility. Where the 
credibility of an accused must be assessed by a jury, the use of such testimony 
may be especially harmful. It concluded that the privilege cannot reasonably be 
confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks that are 
directly incriminating15. Further, in referring to the case of John Murray and 
Funke, the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination ‚is primarily 
concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent16‛. It did not 
extend to the use in criminal proceedings of material that may be obtained from 
the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence 
independent of the will of the suspect, such as breath, blood, and urine 
samples17. 
 
The Court’s approach was developed in Allan v United Kingdom, where an 
undercover police officer had been placed in the applicant’s cell for some weeks 
for the specific purpose of eliciting from the applicant information implicating 
                                                             
13
 ECtHR 25 January 1996, John Murray v. The United Kingdom, (no. 41/1994/488/570), § 47. 
14
 ECtHR 29 November 1996, Saunders v. The United Kingdom, (no. 43/1994/490/572). 
15
 Ibid. § 71. 
16
 Ibid. § 69. 
17
 Ibid. § 69. 
13 
 
the suspect in a murder. The Court began its consideration with the following 
statement of principle: ‚In examining whether a procedure has extinguished the 
very essence of the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court will examine 
the nature and degree of the compulsion, the existence of any relevant 
safeguards in the procedures and the use to which any material so obtained is 
put.18‛ Applying this approach to the facts of the case, the Court defined the 
scope of the right and the privilege in the following terms: 
 
‚While the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination are primarily 
designed to protect against improper compulsion by the authorities and the obtaining of 
evidence through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused, the 
scope of the right is not confined to cases where duress has been brought to bear on the accused 
or where the will of the accused has been directly overborne in some way. The right, which the 
court has previously observed is at the heart of the notion of fair procedure, serves in principles 
to protect the freedom of a suspected person to choose whether to speak or to remain silent 
when questioned by the police.19‛ 
 
We have seen that the Court explained that the scope for the immunities is 
twofold. First, specifically, it protected the accused against abusive coercion 
inquires by the authorities. Secondly, in principle, it supported and defended the 
will of an accused person to speak or to remain silent during police questioning. 
Thus the focus of the case law has been on attempting to distinguish cases of 
improper compulsion from cases where the accused should have been able to 
reach an autonomous decision when he is called upon to answer criminal 
allegations. The robustness of this rationale will be discussed below. 
 
3.2.2  Improper Compulsion 
As regard to the nature and degree of the improper compulsion in police 
questioning to obtain the incriminating statements, first, prohibition on torture 
and other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment are not open to question. 
All European countries prohibit the use or threat of violence and require 
exclusion of confessions so obtained (Herrmann, 2008). Apart from this, 
however, countries differ as to what constitute improper compulsion, as we 
observed in the previous section, with some countries focusing more on the need 
to prevent unreliable confessions and some focusing more on deterring 
improper police practices. Notably, the Court stated explicitly in Murray that it 
did not consider it prudent to ‚give an abstract analysis of the scope of these 
immunities‛ and, in particular, ‚of what constitutes ‘improper compulsion’‛ 20. 
 
Nevertheless, in Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, the Court held that there 
had been a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, where the 
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applicants were convicted and imprisoned for failing to account for their 
movements. The Court held that the ‚degree of compulsion‛ imposed on the 
applicants by the legal obligations with a view to compelling them to provide 
information relating to charges against them ‚destroyed the very essence‛ of 
their privilege against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent 21 . 
Furthermore, noting that the United Kingdom government’s claim of the 
terrorist nature and complexity of the alleged offences, the Court concluded that 
the public interest could not be relied on to justify a provision that extinguished 
this essence22. 
 
Moreover, the Court found no distinction between the imposition of criminal 
sanctions themselves and the threat to impose them. The threat of criminal 
prosecution was at issue in Saunders, where the accused was convicted on a 
number of counts of fraud relating to share dealing. During the investigation of 
the offence, the trade and industry inspectors relied on section 434(5) of the 
Companies Act 1985, which made it a possible contempt of court to refuse to 
produce documents or answer questions posed by fraud investigators, and 
provided that the answers to such questions may be used in evidence against 
him at trial. Thus Saunders was faced with either incriminating himself or being 
in contempt of court, an unenviable dilemma. In this case, the Court concluded 
that the privilege was violated when statements, which were extracted from the 
accused by the investigators under threat of contempt of court, were 
subsequently used against the accused in court 23 . The Court rejected the 
government’s argument that the right and the privilege could be balanced on 
some pressing ground of public interest such as the need to investigate and 
punish fraud. The fairness requirement of Article 6 meant that the immunities 
applied to all types of criminal proceedings without distinction from the most 
simple to the most complex24. 
 
These cases demonstrate a clear type of compulsion, where the suspect’s 
silence amount to a criminal offence. In another words, the cases reveal that 
under Article 6 of the Convention there should be no duty imposed on 
individual suspects, backed by a sanction, to answer the questions of state 
officials in relation to criminal charges against them. Moreover, this approach 
also suggests that when an infringement becomes an issue of the ‚essence of the 
privilege‛, it can never be justified by the security and public order concerns. 
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All of this presupposes a particular relationship between the citizen and the 
state and its officials in the context of criminal justice. According to Redmayne 
(2007: 221), the emphasis on the importance of not compelling the individual 
suspects with legal obligations to supply oral evidence for the purpose of 
prosecution has underlined the necessity of limiting the scope of prosecution 
powers in a liberal democracy as this is when the State is at its most powerful. 
The underlying rationale is that if the suspect was under an obligation to 
cooperate in whatever way in bringing about his or her own conviction in the 
course of police questioning, then the duty of the prosecution to establish guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt would be watered down and even contradicted by the 
duty imposed on the suspect (Ashworth, 2008). On this view, the right and the 
privilege, that is, by guaranteeing individual suspects of not being compelled by 
the threat of criminal sanctions to answer incriminating questions, are 
considered to act as useful brakes on the untrammelled power of investigation 
by the law enforcement officials (Hogan, 1997: 75). In addition, not only might 
the immunities be considered to act as useful brakes on the untrammelled state 
power but statements made under pressure may be unreliable. As will be 
discussed later in the article, their worth is also in the avoidance of miscarriages 
of justice. 
 
However, in a recent road traffic case O’Halloran and Francis v United 
Kingdom, the Court did not seem to follow a consistent line or to relate well to 
the Saunders principles by holding that it could not accept that any direct 
compulsion requiring a suspect to make incriminatory statements automatically 
results in a violation25. The central issue in each of two applications brought in 
this case was whether the privilege was violated when the registered owner of a 
car was required under United Kingdom road traffic law to furnish the name 
and address of the driver of the car when it was caught speeding on camera and, 
whether this evidence could be used in a prosecution. Notably, failure to give 
the information was an offense punishable by a fine and by penalty points on 
the driving license. The Grand Chamber, by fifteen votes to two, held that there 
was no violation of Article 6. Although all cases of direct compulsion, as noted 
above, had been held to violate the privilege in the past, the Court held that this 
is not a necessary conclusion, and that other factors would be taken into account 
in determining whether the essence of the privilege against self-incrimination 
has been violated such as the nature and degree of the compulsion used to 
obtain the evidence, the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure, 
and the use to which any material so obtained was put26. Having regard to these 
factors, particularly the special nature of the regulatory regime at issue and the 
limited nature of the information required, the Court held that the essence of the 
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applicants’ right to remain silent and privilege against self-incrimination had not 
been destroyed, and thus there was no violation of Article 6. 
 
Apparently, in this case, the Grand Chamber allowed direct compulsion to be 
outweighed by other factors. Should this be a cause of concern? Does this 
judgment suggest any loosening of the right and the privilege? According to 
Ashworth (2008: 765), it would be preferable to recognize it as a discrete 
exception. This might be supported by Judge Borrego’s concurring opinion in 
the instant case27, arguing that a citizen who chooses to own and drive a car 
‚accepts the existence of the motor vehicle regulations and undertakes to 
comply with them in order to live as a member of society. These regulations 
clearly entail certain responsibilities.‛ Perhaps more importantly, there is a 
European consensus that the immunities should not apply in this situation 
(Ashworth, 2008, 763). 
 
3.2.3 Freedom to Choose 
Europeans today generally recognize the rule against the use of criminal 
sanctions to compel a person to answer questions in the criminal process; 
however, vast differences remain within the states concerning the nature and 
scope of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination 
(Van Kessel, 1998). More specifically, there is less agreement within the 
Contracting States with respect to how far, short of coercion or oppressive 
methods, authorities may go to persuade or encourage individual suspects to 
speak during pretrial interrogations. Two issues generate the most controversy: 
(1) to what extent may a suspect be disadvantaged from silence, and (2) what 
procedural safeguards must be afforded to a suspect in pretrial interrogation, 
such as warning of the right to silence and the right to counsel. As the rights of 
the defence are procedural rights, their applications in practice depend to a 
larger extent on the legal system under which the case is to be adjudicated. 
Therefore, the interplay of policies at work in balancing state and individual 
interest is likely to vary as the setting changes. 
 
Nevertheless, in both common law and civil law traditions, it has long been 
recognized that only voluntary confessions can be admitted as evidence (Ma, 
2007, 5). The classic protection for common law criminal suspects in police 
questioning has been the voluntariness test according to which confessions have 
to be voluntary before they can be admitted as evidence. In King v. Warickshall 
(1783: 235), the court eloquently explained ‚a free and voluntary confession is 
deserving of the highest credit because it is presumed to flow from the strongest 
sense of guilt and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; 
but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or by the torture of 
fear comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence 
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of guilt that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.‛ On the 
European continent, despite torture having been part of the ordinary criminal 
procedure and regularly permitted to be employed to investigate and prosecute 
routine crime before the ordinary courts in the inquisitorial system, the use of 
coercion was legally abolished throughout the continent during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries (Langbein 1977; Einolf 2007). 
 
Clearly, the British Court’s explanation expresses the view that the exercise 
of free will through a voluntary confession is the best indication of the truth —
autonomy if you like guarantees truth. Arguably, one of the difficulties of this 
substantive rationale here, however, is that voluntariness and consent are 
‘meaningless’ in police questioning where all the choices available to suspects 
are unpleasant (Sanders and Young, 2007, 247). At any rate, many interrogations 
are stressful and unpleasant, where the police, who acknowledge the reason 
they arrested and kept the suspect in police custody for questioning, may give 
the suspect the feeling that the interrogation will be lengthy until the suspect 
provides the interrogators with answers that satisfy them (Kitai-Sangero, 2008). 
Indeed, a suspect’s confession to the police is not voluntary in the same way as a 
spontaneous confession to a clergyman; in this sense, no admission of guilt is 
voluntary (Seidman, 1992). 
 
Seen in this way, the substantive dimension of voluntariness is 
extraordinarily difficult to assert in the coercive atmosphere of a custodial 
interrogation. In fact, Contracting States have upheld the possibility to conduct 
custodial interrogations by establishing safeguards that supposedly ‘dispel’ the 
inherent coercion that it entails. Most notably, the Court, in the earlier case of 
John Murray v United Kingdom, has stated that ‚a certain level of indirect 
compulsion‛ is permissible28. However, after the case of John Murray, the Court 
did not reaffirm an approach that would justify certain ‚proper compulsion‛ as 
only where they do not become an issue of the ‚essence of the privilege‛. The 
underlying reasoning may be that if it is acknowledged that a certain degree of 
compulsion during an interrogation is legitimate, then it is difficult to determine 
when the applied pressure crosses the boundary of the permissible. 
 
Actually, the Court went far beyond the traditional voluntariness test by 
differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable police behaviour when it 
decisively ruled that a custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. In the case 
of Magge v United Kingdom the applicant was detained and access to legal advice 
was delayed for 48 hours. The Court noted that the ‚intimidating atmosphere [of 
a custodial interrogation] specifically devised to sap his will and make him 
confess to his interrogators‛ 29 . Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court 
attempted to preserve the autonomy of the suspect in a manner that would 
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allow the police to continue conducting custodial interrogations. In John Murray, 
the Court stated that the right to remain silent was not an absolute guarantee 
against any and all government efforts to secure information from a suspect 
during interrogations30. The Court assumed that by means of legal assistance it 
would ensure that a suspect’s confession was a reflection of his or her true will 
to cooperate. 
 
According to this rationale, the right and the privilege are designed to protect 
the suspect’s right to reach an autonomous decision by means of legal assistance. 
In drawing attention to shortcomings in the procedures of national systems, the 
Court has had to develop its vision of defence rights in a piecemeal fashion, case 
by case, proceeding on the basis, as the Court has done throughout its 
jurisprudence, that the Convention is a living instrument that requires 
adaptation as circumstances change31. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify 
three broad standards in the development of its distinctive version of the 
immunities. In the following, these three standards will be analyzed with the 
object of throwing some light upon the practical value of the guarantee provided 
therein and of identifying some of the questions left open by the Court 
judgments to date. 
 
Access to a lawyer from the first police interrogation 
First, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the first 
interrogation of a suspect by the police. In the Court’s opinion, early access to a 
lawyer is part of procedural safeguards to which the Court will have particular 
regard when examining whether a procedure has extinguished the very essence 
of the privilege32. The reasons why the Court considers the right of early access 
to legal counsel to be so important are to be found in a passage in Salduz v 
Turkey, which has been restated in a number of subsequent judgments33: 
 
‚The Court underlines the importance of the investigation stage for the preparation of the 
criminal proceedings, as the evidence obtained during this stage determines the framework in 
which the offence charged will be considered at the trial ... At the same time, an accused often 
finds himself in a particularly vulnerable position at that stage of the proceedings, the effect of 
which is amplified by the fact that legislation on criminal procedure tends to become 
increasingly complex, notably with respect to the rules governing the gathering and use of 
evidence. In most cases, this particular vulnerability can only be properly compensated for by 
the assistance of a lawyer whose task it is, among other things, to help to ensure respect of the 
right of an accused not to incriminate himself. This right indeed presupposes that the 
prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to 
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evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the 
accused. 
 
Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain 
sufficiently ‚practical and effective‛ Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer 
should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is 
demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling 
reasons to restrict this right.‛ 
 
In fact, there are two kinds of rationales mentioned that are somewhat mixed 
together: what has been described as a protective rationale that the right of early 
access to a lawyer is needed to ensure that suspects are not coerced into making 
confessions and a participative defence rationale that claims that lawyer is 
needed in advising on the complexities of gathering and using evidence to 
achieve an effective defence. 
 
The protective rationale would seem to highlight the Court’s 
acknowledgment of the inherent coercive nature of the custodial interrogation. 
In a recent case, Pishchalnikov v Russia, the Court held that the police, prosecution 
authorities, and experts in the field of criminal proceedings are well-equipped 
with various, often psychologically coercive, interrogation techniques that 
facilitate, or even prompt, receipt of information from an accused. In the instant 
case, the Court observed that, having been denied legal assistance, the applicant 
in the first few days after arrest had been subjected to intense interrogations by 
the police who are in an effort to generate evidence aiding the prosecution’s 
case34. With these facts in mind, the Court considered there is no evidence that 
the confessions made by the applicant during those interrogations were initiated 
by the suspect35. In the Court’s view, ‚if an accused has no lawyer [during police 
interrogation], he has less chance of being informed of his rights and, as a 
consequence, there is less chance that they will be respected‛36. It is certainly 
arguable that in custodial interrogation the potential for systemic abuse of law 
enforcement powers is at its greatest (Toney, 2001). Empirical study of police 
detectives reveals that they are anything but neutral or impartial in their 
collection and construction of case evidence against criminal suspects during the 
interrogation process (McConville, Sanders, and Leng, 1991; Williams, 2000; 
Cape, Hodgson, Prakken, and Spronken, 2007). 
 
The participative defence rationale, which would seem to be the primary 
concern, highlights the Court’s acknowledgment of the important impact the 
interrogation stage may have for the subsequent criminal proceedings, the 
vulnerable position that the suspects are in, and of the need of lawyer help 
therefore to achieve an effective defence. Noticeably, in Salduz, the Court 
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expressly linked the right of access not only to the need to protect the accused 
against abusive conduct on the part of the authorities and the prevention of 
miscarriages of justice but also to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably 
‚equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the 
accused‛37. Equality of arms, an old principle with roots in both common law 
and civil law traditions, is a principle that has been expressed as affording every 
party to the proceedings ‚a reasonable opportunity to present his case in 
conditions that do not place him at substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his 
opponent‛38. 
 
Although traditionally the principle of equality of arms has been reserved for 
the trial, there seems to have been widespread realization that the examination 
of evidence did not always occur at the court (Summers, 2007, 28). In both 
common law and civil law systems, the police are permitted to detain persons 
suspected of committing crimes to interrogate them before deciding whether 
and when to initiate criminal proceedings and to produce them before the court 
(Kitai-Sangero, 2008). Unless the prosecution is prevented from using the 
information obtained in custodial interrogation as evidence, the police are likely 
to regard interrogation as an important opportunity to obtain evidence to be 
used to encourage suspects to plead guilty or to be used against them at their 
trials. Such evidence may be in the form of a confession, but may alternatively be 
in the form of an inconsistent account given by the suspect, demonstrating lies 
told by the suspect, or even failure to answer questions put by the police (Cape, 
2002, 113). 
 
The situation in the interrogation room is compounded by the fact that 
suspects normally want to provide an account of themselves (Jackson, 2009a, 
850). Nearly every European Continental country today has adopted rules that 
technically prohibit courts from drawing unfavourable inferences from a 
suspect’s silence, with England, Scotland, and Norway being exceptions (Van 
Kessel, 1998). However, in practice, in most jurisdictions, irrespective of whether 
there is a rule against adverse inferences from silence or not, most suspects do 
speak to the police or testify during interrogations (Van Kessel, 1998; Kitai-
Sangero, 2008; Jackson, 2009a). Scholars realized that suspects feel pressure to 
speak because silence can be considered as an act of noncooperation with the 
authorities, which can do the suspect little good in terms of decisions that affect 
his or her liberty or that affect the level of the charge brought (Damaska, 1973; 
Dixon, 1991; Jackson, 2009a). 
 
In the Court’s view, the defence right to speak for oneself is a double-edged 
sword with the potential to count against the suspect. In Pishchalnikov, the Court 
reiterated that the criminal law —substantive as well as procedural —and 
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criminal proceedings are a rather complex and technical matter that is often 
incomprehensible to laypersons, such as the suspect 39 . In the absence of 
assistance by counsel, who could have provided legal advice and technical skills, 
the applicant was unable to make the correct assessment of the consequences the 
decision to confess would have on the outcome of the criminal case40. Moreover, 
practically at every stage of criminal proceedings decisions have to be taken, the 
wrong decision being able to cause irreparable damage. Hence the Court 
concluded reliable knowledge of law and practice is usually required to assess 
the consequences of such decisions41. 
 
Further, in emphasizing the importance of the appearance of justice, the 
Court drew attention to the increased sensitivity of the public to the fair 
administration of criminal justice: ‚it is of fundamental importance in a 
democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in the public and above all, 
as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, in the accused.42‛ It is noticed that 
‚an ultimately successful appeal against conviction, secured on the basis of the 
absence of legal advice meant that a confession made to a police officer was 
unreliable, which is determined following months, if not years, in pre-trial 
detention, is likely to leave the accused resentful and distrustful not just of the 
police, but of the whole criminal justice apparatus (Cape et al. 2010, 4).‛ In 
Pishchalnikov v Russia, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated 
robbery. He was interrogated — both on the day of his arrest and immediately 
on the following day —in the absence of a lawyer, although he had clearly 
indicated a defence counsel he wanted to represent him. During these 
interrogations the applicant confessed to having taken part in the activities of a 
criminal group that included a murder, kidnapping, hijacking, and unlawful 
possession of weapons. The Court considered it unlikely the applicant could 
reasonably have appreciated the consequence of his proceeding to be questioned 
without the assistance of counsel43. 
 
Certainly, Russia is not an exception. Although the right to contact a lawyer 
after arrest exists in most Contracting States, there is a great divergence as to the 
moment at which the right to a lawyer can be effected (Spronken, Vermeulen, De 
Vocht and Van Puyenbroeck, 2009, 38). In a considerable number of countries, 
such as Belgium, Austria, and Germany, the right to counsel is not possible 
immediately after arrest but only at a given stage of the investigative 
proceedings. The Court indicated that even where compelling reasons may 
exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction —whatever its 
justification —must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 
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6. The Court further considered that the lack of legal assistance during a 
suspect’s interrogation would constitute a restriction of his or her defence rights, 
and that these rights will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when 
incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a 
lawyer are used for a conviction44. This new interpretation of Article 6 § 3 of the 
Convention, referred as the ‚Salduz doctrine‛, has been confirmed in several 
subsequent judgments. 
 
Waiver standard for the right to counsel 
Second, the right to counsel from the first police interrogation, being a 
fundamental right among those that constitute the notion of fair trial and 
ensuring the effectiveness of the rest of the foreseen guarantees of Article 6 of 
the Convention, is a prime example of those rights that require the special 
protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard45. The Court does not 
rule out that a suspect may himself waive the right to legal assistance and 
respond to interrogations46. But the Court emphasized in Pishchalnikov that such 
a waiver ‚must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and 
intelligent relinquishment of a right. Before an accused can be said to have 
implicitly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it 
must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of 
his conduct would be‛ 47 . In the Court’s view, a valid waiver cannot be 
established by showing only that a suspect responded to further police-initiated 
interrogation even if he or she has been reminded of the right to remain silent 
and signed the form stating these rights. Somewhat akin to the Miranda rules48, 
when a suspect has invoked the right to be assisted by counsel during 
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interrogation, the Court is of the opinion that the suspect should not be subject 
to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available 
to the suspect, unless the suspect himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police or prosecution49. 
 
A lawyer can not only ensure the legality of any measures taken in the course 
of the investigation proceedings, he can also provide advice and assistance on 
how to mount the most effective defence. It hence has been argued that such a 
rule allowing prior consultation with an attorney would make it virtually 
impossible for police to obtain confession evidence (Kitai-Sangero, 2008, 151). In 
the absence of empirical data either way, these arguments tend to consist of 
inflated claims about the effect of the lawyer as an obstacle for convicting the 
guilty without enough attention being given to the procedural context in which 
the right operates50. In fact, when a reasonable explanation is given that could 
clear the suspect of all suspicion, a lawyer in most jurisdictions might advise the 
suspect to provide his or her version of the event because silence at the police 
station could increase the police interrogators’ suspicion against the suspect 
(Damaska, 1973; Seidmann and Stain, 2000). Moreover, the fact that the suspect 
has not provided his or her version at the first opportunity available could 
weaken the credibility of a later version provided in court. Actually, various 
options are available at this stage as they are at the trial. One may suggest 
certain lines of exculpatory inquiry. One may be made aware that they have an 
opportunity to respond to certain allegations and all this information will enter 
into the totality of data on the basis of which guilt-determination will eventually 
be made. In recognition of the growth in nonjudicial disposals across a number 
of jurisdictions, the suspect would also be made aware of any informal disposals 
or decisions that may be made if they are prepared to make an admission to the 
allegations. As Jackson (2009a: 861) pointed out, ‚once the rights of the defence 
are put in place < the right of silence reverts to an exercise of will or choice on 
the part of the individual accused, but a choice that is made on an informed 
basis as part of a defence strategy which is taken in full recognition of the costs 
and benefits of its exercise.‛ 
 
The quality of the defence lawyer’s work 
Third, as a general rule, a state cannot be held responsible for every 
shortcoming on the part of a lawyer appointed for legal aid purposes. The 
Convention does not contain any explicit provision regarding the role, or 
standards, of criminal defence lawyers. As regards the quality of the work of a 
defence lawyer, the Court has been reluctant to hold the State liable for the 
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failures of a lawyer’s defence. In Imbrioscia, the Court stated explicitly that 
‚owing to the legal profession’s independence, the conduct of the defence is 
essentially a matter between the defendant and his representative; under Article 
6 para. 3 (c) the Contracting States are required to intervene only if a failure by 
counsel to provide effective representation is manifest or sufficiently brought to 
their attention‛51. In the court’s opinion, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be 
provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police; however, it is 
not for the Court to speculate on the impact that a suspect’s access to a lawyer 
during police custody would have had on the ensuing proceedings 52 . It is 
unlikely that the Convention protects the legally aided suspect who, ex post 
facto, challenges a legal adviser’s reasonable exercise of discretion or tactical 
decision. 
 
During the all important pretrial investigation, there are important legal and 
ethical constraints upon the lawyer’s ability to prepare the defence case. The 
equality of the defence is, of course, linked inextricably to the legal procedural 
role that the lawyer might properly be expected to play within the space allotted 
to him or her in the criminal process. In an adversarial procedure, we would 
expect the defence lawyer to have comprehensive freedom to investigate the 
case for the accused —to have early access to the suspect, interview witnesses, 
gather expert evidence, and so on. In inquisitorial procedure, where evidence 
gathering is the responsibility of a central judicial enquirer, the defence lawyer, 
who is subsidiary to that of the central enquirer, may mainly serve to ensure the 
legality of the proceedings. Closely linked to the ways in which the defence 
lawyer’s function is defined and understood within criminal procedure, defence 
lawyers in Contracting States are most likely to adopt different defence 
strategies to achieve their clients’ best interests. As Van Kessel (1998: 816) 
observed, defence lawyer in Netherlands, in which the judges possess both the 
power and motivation to reward those early confessors with noncriminal 
alternatives, generally advises suspects to cooperate and give their side of the 
case at an early stage in the proceedings. 
 
Importantly, any defence strategy cannot be implemented in a meaningful 
way without disclosure of relevant evidence. The ‘cat and mouse’ game played 
at custodial interrogation, in which police use of evidence plays a significant 
part, may deprive the suspect of adequate facilities for the preparation of a 
defence (Toney, 2001). Legal advisers need adequate details of the case against 
the suspect to advise the suspect effectively on such important matters as 
whether to remain silent or whether to respond to certain allegations that have 
arisen against the suspect. As explained earlier, there are various options 
available at the pretrial stage as at the trial. Hence, if there are no clear 
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procedures for the use and disclosure of evidence by the police at custodial 
interrogation, it is argued the lawyer’s engagement in the defence or guilty plea 
procedure is likely to be little more than symbolic, lending credibility to the legal 
process rather than providing the suspect with an effective defence guarantee 
(Toney, 2001; Hodgson, 2006). 
 
Yet the precise parameters of the requirement of disclosure of relevant 
information to the defence and the right to comment on the evidence during 
police interrogation remain uncertain in the Court’s jurisprudence. In Rowe and 
Davis v United Kingdom, the Court held that the full disclosure right is not 
absolute prior to trial, and there are competing interests such as national security 
or the need to protect witnesses at risk of reprisals or to keep secret methods of 
police investigation of crime, which must be weighed against the rights of the 
suspect. Nonetheless, the Court emphasized any limitation on disclosure must 
be ‚strictly necessary‛ and subject to procedural safeguards that compensate for 
the handicap imposed on the defence53. 
 
We must bear in mind that consistent with the wide margin of appreciation 
afforded to the Contracting states, the Court’s concern is not with procedural 
guarantee per se, but rather with their effect on the overall fairness of the 
proceedings 54 . The Court has permitted inroads to be made by domestic 
jurisdictions into the specific rights provided that the trial as a whole may be 
considered fair in an attempt to accommodate established procedures within the 
two prevailing traditions. Recent research shows that there appears to be no 
consensus so far between EU jurisdictions as to the precise formulation of 
pretrial disclosure (Cape et al. 2010). Nevertheless, most member states do give a 
right to the accused or their lawyers at the pretrial stage to information about the 
evidence, although the scope of the right varies enormously and, in particular, 
depend upon whether the jurisdiction has an adversarial or inquisitorial 
tradition (Spronken et al. 2009). 
 
4 Conclusion 
Since it came into force in 1953, the European Convention on Human Rights 
has served as a reflection of Europe’s effort toward the establishment of common 
standards of individual human rights and freedoms. The forty-seven countries 
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that are currently signatories to the Convention are subject to the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights, which was established in 1959 in 
Strasbourg as a mechanism to interpret and enforce the obligations created by 
the Convention. Although the Convention contains no explicit reference to the 
right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court, 
drawing its rationale from Article 6 of the Convention, has been steadily 
developing its distinctive vision of the right and the privilege in an attempt to 
create a doctrine that sets a limit below which contracting parties could not 
allow their legal systems to fall, and at the same time accords with the 
established procedures within the civil law and common law traditions of its 
Contracting States. 
 
The scope of the Court’s distinctive vision of the right to remain silent and 
the privilege against self-incrimination is thus two-fold: 
 
On the one hand, the Court has demonstrated its strong position for the core 
principle that state power should not be used to compel self-incrimination. In 
recent years, criminal procedure systems throughout Europe are being severely 
tested by the increasing ease of movement between European countries as well 
as by the problems of organized crime, drug trafficking and, most urgently, 
international terrorism. The tension between due process and crime control is 
inevitable, and it is at the time when a state exercises its law enforcement 
authorities that the substantive individual rights are most likely to clash with the 
state’s interest in seeking the most effective means of crime control. Despite 
these challenges, the Court took the view that there should be no duty imposed 
on individual suspects, backed by a sanction, to answer the questions of state 
officials in relation to criminal offenses. Moreover, in evaluating self-
incrimination challenges, the Court has also shown no inclination to balance the 
security and public order concerns when an infringement becomes an issue of 
the ‚essence of the privilege‛. The Court’s position reflects a European 
commitment to respect individual human rights in the law enforcement process 
by requiring the domestic law of the Contracting States to keep within certain 
bounds. 
 
On the other hand, the Court’s perspective suggests that the suspect should 
have been able to reach an autonomous decision when called upon to answer 
criminal allegations. This stems from the Court’s belief that the right to a fair 
hearing does not mean that the right to remain silent is absolute and the 
recognition of the privilege against self-incrimination is not incompatible with 
learning what happened from the suspect. It held that the right to have access to 
a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the 
police while still permitting procedures that encourage defendants to 
meaningfully participate in the fact-finding process. Yet the precise parameters 
of the requirement of disclosure of relevant information to the defence and the 
right to comment on the evidence during police interrogation remain uncertain 
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in the Court’s jurisprudence. We must bear in mind that consistent with the 
wide margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States, the Court’s 
concern is not with the essentiality for the special rights to be respected in every 
case, but rather with their effect on the overall fairness of the proceedings. As 
explained, despite the binding nature of the Court, the Court does not have 
jurisdiction to strike down national laws. It is up to the Contracting States to take 
steps to make necessary amendments in their domestic laws to bring them into 
compliance with the Convention provisions. As the rights of the defence are 
procedural rights, for safeguards in police questioning to be adequate and 
effective will in practice depend to a larger extent on each legal system’s own 
historically developed institutions and the faith that different societies place in 
them 55 . Therefore, the Court, in an attempt to accommodate within both 
common law and civil law traditions the understanding of the defence lawyer’s 
function and to adapt to diverse institutional frameworks of its Contracting 
States, has permitted inroads to be made into the right to disclosure by domestic 
jurisdictions provided the limitation on disclosure is viewed in proper 
perspective, such as for a favourable result for the accused. 
 
Nevertheless, we would like to stress that although the scope of the right to 
disclosure is thereby left to the national authorities, their decisions remain 
subject to review by the Court for conformity with the fair trial requirement of 
the Convention. As indicated, it is no longer possible for proof processes to be 
dominated by judicial inquiry but neither is it possible for them to be dominated 
entirely by a trial contest between partisan parties refereed by a passive judge. 
The Court’s approach that emphasizes the importance of legal assistance from 
the first interrogation of a suspect by law enforcement officials has enabled 
suspects to play an active role when they are being called upon to answer 
criminal allegations. This approach actually takes criminal procedure beyond the 
traditional boundaries of adversarial/inquisitorial discourse. Accordingly, both 
systems face new challenges and we may witness further divergence of existing 
pretrial proceedings as countries adapt their procedures to meet the demands of 
interrogation fairness laid down by the Court. However, controversy often 
remains as to whether the changes effected by the Contracting States are in full 
compliance with the decisions of the Court. So long as Contracting States’ 
decisions remain subject to review by the Court, elements that are incompatible 
with the effective defence rights are likely to be subject to the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the future. In this sense, the margin of appreciation gives the 
flexibility needed to avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and the 
Contracting States even as realizing a ‚uniform standard‛ of human rights. 
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